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Is Free Trade “Free”? Is It Even “Trade”?
Oppression and Consent in Hemispheric Trade
Agreements
Frank J. Garcia1
“…where there is voluntary agreement, there…is justice.”
Plato, Symposium2

“The United States seems destined by Providence to plague
Latin America with misery in the name of liberty.”
Simon Bolivar3
“[T]hat trade which, without force or constraint, is naturally
and regularly carried on between any two places, is always
advantageous, though not equally so, to both.”
Adam Smith4
In order for free trade as a policy to deliver fully on its social promise, it
must be both “free” and “trade.” The phrase “free trade” invokes the idea
of freedom in two ways. The conventional meaning of the phrase is that
trade is free if it is not subject to distorting governmental regulation.5 The
second, less obvious, meaning is that free trade involves consensual
exchange—it has the consent of those involved in the trade. This is true at
the level of private exchange and also at the institutional level, involving the
structure and negotiation of the agreements framing trade relations.
In this essay, I argue that for free trade to be both free and trade, it must
be free in the second sense as well as the first: it must be consensual. In
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fact, it must be free, in the sense of voluntary, to be trade at all. If trade
does not involve the consent of both the participants and the states involved,
it is not trade in the fullest sense, but partakes of some form of oppression:
predation, exploitation, or coercion. For both normative and practical
reasons, free trade requires that global economic relations be structured
through agreements that reflect the consent of those subject to them.
Today, the neoliberal trading system only imperfectly lives up to this
obligation.
To illustrate this, I examine the role of consent in trade agreements,
drawing on examples from the recent trade agreement among the United
States, Central America, and the Dominican Republic (CAFTA) as
representative of important trends in multilateral and hemispheric
integration systems. This exploration has normative implications for the
justification of the neoliberal trading system, as well as practical
implications for the analysis and structure of trade agreements and for the
stability and security of our foreign relations.
This essay focuses on the social aspect of trade—involving trade as a set
of economic relations and as a system for governing such relations—rather
than on the private level of individual transactions (although I utilize
examples from private exchange). In Part I, I look at some aspects of our
language, concepts, and cultural experiences of trade as a human
phenomenon, suggesting a preliminary definition of trade related to
consensual exchange.

In Part II, through an examination of CAFTA’s

negotiation process and select substantive provisions, I hope to tease out the
elements of trade agreements that represent dynamics other than trade, such
as predation, exploitation, or coercion. Such an argument cannot hope to be
definitive, but I hope it is suggestive—reliably so—of subtle but important
forces at work in contemporary trade relations, particularly as they involve
substantial inequalities in power among participating states. If I am correct
that an investigation into the nature of trade as a human experience reveals
that many aspects of current trade law and policy mix what is ostensibly
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free trade with something else—exploitation, coercion, or predation—then
this has important normative and pragmatic implications for trade policy
and our own security, as I suggest in Part III. A short conclusion follows.

I. INVESTIGATION OF TRADE AS A HUMAN EXPERIENCE
Both our language and our collective experience of trade suggest many
possible aspects or dimensions of the experience that merit further inquiry
as we try to understand just what trade is.6
A. The Many Dimensions of Trade
1. Trade as Exchange
To begin, trade can be seen as involving transactions. When we trade,
we engage in a transaction—something changes hands, so to speak.

I

exchange a good with you for the good you have that I want. In this sense,
trade is a basic everyday experience among people.7
We also speak of trade, in a specifically international sense, as exchanges
involving the crossing of geographic and political boundaries. This evokes
other dimensions of trade, such as trade as exploration, where economic
need rouses us out of the known into the unknown; and trade as adventure:
Will this gamble pay off? Will the merchant ships arrive? Will my fortune
grow or be lost?8
2. Trade as Encounter
The desire to exchange brings us into contact with one another;
historically, we have crossed boundaries to engage in trade and it has meant
encounters with the “Other.”9 Thus, trade is one of the prime forces in
bringing peoples in contact with other peoples on terms that might result in
a mutually beneficial exchange. In this way, trade is a primal form of
communication, expressing who we are, what we make, what we want, and
how we exchange.
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One of the marvelous aspects of trade is that it can involve
communication and exchange with the Other where there is no shared
language, culture, or history—only the mutual desire to exchange. In this
way, we can see that trade involves a form of what Stanley Cavell calls
“acknowledgement”—the recognition that the Other exists as a separate,
recognizable human person, even if we cannot directly or fully know the
person’s mind.10
Of course, encounters with the Other are not always beneficent.11 We
can try to profit from the lack of shared language, or other information
asymmetries, to engage in sharp dealing—trade as trickery or deceit. We
have many colloquial examples of this, including offers to sell one another
the Brooklyn Bridge, or the fable about Manhattan being “purchased” from
indigenous Americans for a “handful of beads.”12
3. Trade as Domination
This raises another, more serious aspect of trade: trade as conquest.
Obviously, I cannot mean this literally: conquest is conquest. However, if
we consider the “trade” relations of the East India Company, for example,
or the notorious “Unequal Treaties” between China and the West, we can
see an aspect of trade as domination under the guise of trading.13 Anthony
Anghie chronicles the way in which trading companies were used to assert
sovereignty and extend the colonizing states’ dominion over vast territories
that the European states were not yet ready to administer directly.14
Similarly, James Gathii documents the role of free trade concepts in
legitimating Belgium’s monopoly on exploitation of the Congo under the
“freedom of commerce” principles agreed upon at the Berlin Conference.15
By arguing that trade should be free, the colonial powers effectively left the
stage open for unregulated exploitation of the Congo.16 These examples
illustrate how trade can function as a form of dominance over the Other.17
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B. Investigating Trade as a Transaction
I would now like to take a few of these aspects of trade and further
explore them in order to construct a preliminary picture of trade as a human
experience.
1. Trade as an Exchange of Value
I will begin with the notion of trade as a transaction. We engage in many
types of transactions throughout our lives, involving money, sentiment,
goods, ideas, services, affinity, or information. But if we think of what
distinguishes trade from the many other exchanges we experience, it is that
trade involves a transfer of economic value.
2. Trade as a Bilateral Exchange of Value
There are many different types of transactions involving a transfer of
value. Gifts, for example, are transactions involving a transfer of value, but
one of their distinguishing characteristics is their unilateral nature: the gift
giver transfers something of value for nothing in return.18 This helps us see
that trade transactions are bilateral, or mutual, in nature. They involve a
bilateral exchange of economic value.
3. Trade as a Voluntary Bilateral Exchange for Value
There is another type of unilateral transaction helpful in clarifying the
nature of trade: theft. A theft involves a transfer of value, but it is not
voluntary. It could be said that theft is not trade because it is unilateral, but
it is easy to see that this is not the essence of the distinction; the thief could
give you a cheap watch in return for your wallet, but it would still be a theft
despite its bilateral quality.

Thus, trade must also be voluntary—both

parties must consent to the transaction or there is some element of theft.
This definition of voluntariness is reflected in our language. We can
speak of good trades versus bad trades in terms of meeting our goals, and
yet we also distinguish bad trades from “rip-offs” or thefts. We would not
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refer to the experience of being robbed as a “bad trade,” except in a
deliberately ironic sense.

And so, trade involves bilateral voluntary

exchanges.
4. Trade as a Voluntary Negotiated Exchange for Value
There is a further aspect to the voluntariness of bilateral exchange, and
that aspect can be expressed as the notion of bargain. Bargaining, or the
process of reaching mutually agreeable terms, is a necessary element of
reaching consent and presumes the freedom of both parties to consider and
propose a variety of possibilities on the road to saying yes or no.19 Where
either of the parties is not able to bargain freely, the resulting transaction
may still be voluntary in a basic sense, but something has been lost. That is
more like coercion than trade (this concept will be more fully developed in
a moment).
This notion of bargained-for consent is reflected in our law through the
concept of a “meeting of minds.” The “meeting of minds” in contract law,
even as a constructive notion, is a key to the whole doctrinal armature for
enforcing promises.

For example, if we look at many of the key

justifications for getting out of a contract—mistake, duress, or fraud—we
can see that they reflect the absence of a meeting of minds, an absence of
bargained-for consent.20
This brings us back to the aspect of trade as acknowledgement: the act of
reaching a bargain presupposes the existence of another mind similar
enough in its basic functions (consulting self-interest, evaluating, judging,
bargaining) to be recognizably human—to be “like me.”21 The reaching of
a bargain can be a moment of affirmation of the Other’s humanity, of
similarity to self.

In fact, acknowledgement is a presupposition of

consent—and therefore of trade—in that we have to acknowledge the
Other’s humanity before we can value the Other’s consent.22 In summary,
trade can be understood as consisting of voluntary, bargained-for exchanges
of value among persons for mutual economic benefit.
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C. What is Not Trade and Why
Based on this preliminary inquiry, I would like to look more closely at
several alternatives to trade; that is, to examine other forms of economic
interaction that are not trade, or at least not simply trade, in order to paint a
fuller picture of what trade is and what it is not. In doing so, I will rely
primarily on the work of Simone Weil, the “philosopher of oppression,” for
her frank examination of the role of consent and its absence in
distinguishing between economic transactions and economic oppression.23
1. Predation
In the previous discussion on the nature of exchange, I introduced the
concept of theft as a contrast to trade. What is essential to this distinction is
the absence of consent on the part of the one surrendering economic value.
Weil writes that one cannot seek consent where there is no power of
refusal.24 Thus, where there is no power to refuse, there is no trade because
there can be no consent.
At the private-party level, contract law recognizes this difference through
the concept of duress as a defense to the finding of a contractual
obligation.25 In other words, where one party’s consent to enter into a
contract was not freely given, but is given under some form of pressure, the
law will not recognize this as a meeting of minds and will not find a
contract.26
In economic terms, the equivalent to theft—transactions which are not
mutual and where consent is not present—can be called extraction or
predation; add a political element and we call it economic dominance or
colonialism. In these cases, an economic benefit flows from one party to
the other, but it is not mutual in a meaningful sense, and most importantly,
it is not consensual. Rather, the economic benefit in these cases is achieved
through power inequalities as expressed in economic or military force.
Such transactions are not consistent with our concept of trade as I have
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outlined it above; they are, instead, a form of wealth extraction in the purest
colonial sense.
2. Coercion
Short of extraction, we can recognize a more subtle weakening of
consent, involving what I will call coercion.27 Coercion occurs when a
transaction is mutual and in some basic way consensual, but something
weakens the fullness or freedom of the consent, short of outright theft or
duress. This may still be a trade transaction in some meaningful sense, but
something else is going on, usually involving a restriction on the range of
possible bargains that the parties are free, or not free, to propose and
consider. Thus, coercion presupposes an inequality in bargaining power,
which one party has exercised on the other party to limit the range of
possibilities “on the table,” so to speak. 28
As with duress, contract law also reflects this distinction.

The law

provides particular protections for consumers and others with weaker
bargaining power when they deal in what contract law calls “adhesion
contracts,” or contracts with commercial parties or manufacturers with
greater bargaining power. In such cases (where a dealer says “if you want
this, these are the terms and the only terms,” and a consumer cannot
negotiate), courts will look carefully before assuming the consumer’s
consent to adverse terms of the contract, despite the fact that, in all other
material respects, it looks as if a contract was voluntarily entered into.
Courts will not automatically void such a contract, as would be the case
with duress, but they will look closely at the contract and they may not
enforce all of its provisions.
Put into the terms of this essay, coercion can result in trade—if there is
mutuality of exchange and some form of consent—but not free trade,
because one of the two parties is not fully free to bargain.29 The element of
coercion introduces normative, substantive, and practical considerations that
will be discussed further below.
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3. Exploitation
In some very interesting and suggestive recent work, Hillel Steiner
extends his liberal theory of exploitation to consider international economic
exchanges, contrasting free trade to exploitation.30

In addition to the

requirements that trade be both a bilateral exchange and voluntary, Steiner
adds a third element—that the two transfers are of roughly equal value.31
Where two transfers are not of equal value, yet the exchange is voluntary,
Steiner characterizes this as evidence of exploitation.32
Exploitation can have many causes, but the classical illustration Steiner
offers is of a market for services in which the top bid, the one the service
provider ultimately accepts, does not reflect the maximum possible value of
the services, but is simply the top bid in that market.33 Steiner does not rely,
however, on an objective theory of value to characterize the bid as
inadequate.34 Instead, he suggests we look at other parties who might have
bid, and perhaps bid more, but for various reasons did not.35
Among the reasons other parties did not bid—reasons which may
indicate exploitation—we include the possibility that earlier rights
violations occurred, meaning that potential offerors lacked the capital to bid
despite an interest in doing so, or the possibility that governmental
interference on either side prevented them from participating in the
auction.36 In either case, the result for the service provider is that they
accept a voluntary mutual exchange, but for less than they might otherwise
have received under circumstances that we would consider exploitative. In
other words, the transaction is consensual and mutual, yet exploitative, for
the reason that a potentially higher-paying third party was not able to
participate in the auction.37
Applied to trade, this proposition suggests that where certain third-party
states and/or citizens are kept out of markets, or are economically unable to
participate effectively in markets, an offeror suffers a detriment because
he/she receives a lower bid from someone else. Therefore, the resulting
trades between that offeror and the ultimate purchaser are not free trade but,
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rather, exploitation.38 This differs from coercion in that the force, pressure,
or rights violation occurs with respect to the third party, not between the
two primary parties to the transaction.

Nevertheless, this affects our

evaluation of the consensual nature of the resulting transaction in that the
offeror’s consent was granted among a restricted range of choices.

In

contrast to coercion, however, the restriction was not a function of the
relative power of the parties, but of the oppression of a third party. Once
again, as with coercion, exploitation can result in trade—there is mutuality
of exchange and some form of consent—but not free trade since the parties
were not free to consider all possible offers because of the rights violations
of third-party potential offerors.
To summarize, the essence of free trade, as I am defining it, is consent to
a voluntary, mutual, bargained-for exchange of roughly equal value. I have
suggested three other types of transaction which, while they may look in
some ways like free trade, do not in fact meet this definition: theft or
predation, which may not be trade at all; coercion; and exploitation, which
may be trade in some sense, but also introduces other dynamics of concern
for normative and pragmatic reasons. Participants in any of these three
transactions will see economic value exchange hands, and society may reap
some economic benefit, but this occurs under conditions involving the
absence of either basic consent, or the fullness of consent.

II. APPLICATION TO TRADE AGREEMENTS: A REVIEW OF CAFTA
If trade consists of voluntary bargained-for exchanges, then the rules
governing trade must preserve the possibility of bargained-for exchanges
among private parties, and the rules themselves must be the fruit of such a
bargain. If the rules of the game are not mutually agreed-to, then any
bargains struck under those rules are not fully free because they are not
fully agreed-to. This means there is an essential role for consent in making
trade agreements that are about free trade, or “trade” at all.
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consent, agreements structuring economic exchange will be a form of
oppression or, worse, predation.
This consent must go beyond mere recognition of the formal sovereign
equality of states, the formal legitimacy of governments, and the formalities
of ratification. Consent must extend to difficult questions: whether the
states have anything resembling equal bargaining power; whether a
negotiating government speaks for the full range of affected citizens (or
whether it speaks for its people at all); and whether a government has an
adequate alternative to a negotiated outcome.39

Otherwise, we risk
40

mistaking a mere form of consent for actual consent.

In order to illustrate how this dynamic of consent works, I will examine
some key aspects of CAFTA41—a recent trade agreement between the
United States and five Central American states and the Dominican
Republic—for evidence of inequality in power between parties and how this
inequality was used to vitiate or weaken consent. In other words, I am
looking for examples of what is ostensibly free trade, but in fact may be a
form of coercion (no free bargaining), exploitation (no equivalent value), or
predation (no consent).
A. Nature of the Negotiations
There are two basic areas to examine when looking for aspects of trade
agreements that preserve or jeopardize consent or reveal the degree of
consent that went into their formation. First, we must look at the nature of
the negotiations. There are at least two issues here: the problem of unequal
bargaining power between states, and the question of legitimacy stemming
from the problem of underrepresented groups. Second, we must look at the
terms of the agreement and what was substantively agreed to between the
parties.

Key substantive areas to examine include the following: the

treaty’s dispute resolution mechanism; the structure and timing of market
access available to the parties; the extent and nature of domestic law reform
mandated by the treaty; and what provisions exist, if any, for special or
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differential treatment.

The negotiation and substantive aspects of the

inquiry are interrelated. For example, the more unequal the bargaining
power, the more we would expect the substance to be one-sided as well.
1. Theft and Lack of Representation
We cannot assume even in the United States, let alone most developing
countries, that the government speaks for all affected sectors of society.
This issue is of special concern throughout the Central American region,
where governments have a history of capture by elites.42
Lack of representation is particularly serious when fundamental
economic decisions are being made, as in the CAFTA negotiations. In
Nicaragua, for example, many sectors of society were concerned that the
new government only spoke for and negotiated on behalf of the monied
interests, despite a recent history of social revolution.43

There was

widespread ignorance among most affected groups regarding what CAFTA
would in fact do, and there were allegations of a campaign of
disinformation on the part of the government.44
To the extent that the government did negotiate only for the monied
interests and conducted a disinformation campaign, the legitimacy of the
treaty is undercut.

As will be further discussed below,45 this lack of

legitimacy should concern the U.S. government, even though such tactics
might seem beneficial in the short run, in that they streamline for the United
States the process of securing concessions sought on behalf of U.S. interests
by minimizing dissenting voices. The implication is that the treaty cannot
be viewed as expressing the consent of many of the affected parties. In the
terms of this essay, the treaty does not create free trade for them, but is
instead a form of theft or extraction. For such parties, the treaty and its
resulting economic activity are neither mutual nor voluntary; the parties are
not trading—something is being taken from them.
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2. Exploitation and Lack of Real Alternatives
Even if CAFTA were to prove to be both mutual and voluntary, we must
still consider whether it represents the full consent of the parties. During
the CAFTA negotiations, for example, it was often mentioned by the
Nicaraguan government that the country did not have a real alternative to
the treaty because the United States plays such a dominant role in the
Nicaraguan economy as the principal source of capital and markets.46 Put
in the terms of this essay, this raises the possibility that the treaty may be
exploitative.
Given the history of external domination of the southern hemisphere,
both colonially and post-colonially, we must consider the possibility that
other states in the region and elsewhere—states that might have offered
more attractive alternative markets and sources of capital than the United
States—may not have been able to do so. The United States, for example,
exercised its role as the regional hegemon during the last century by
restricting regional and other states’ opportunities in the hemisphere, which
has continuing economic effects today.47

Put in the framework Hillel

Steiner has developed, this raises the risk that any trade agreements formed
between the United States and states in the region are exploitative in
nature.48 More specifically, the risk is that the United States will exploit the
fact that in this trade negotiation “auction,” its bid is the highest bid, either
because other regional parties do not have the ability to effectively bid (due
to the absence of sufficient economic development), or because other
external parties have not been able to develop ties, levels of commerce, and
investments to match the levels of the United States.
B. Substantive Provisions
There is evidence that suggests the same dynamics previously discussed
are also at work in CAFTA’s substantive provisions.

Inequality in

bargaining power and the problem of legitimacy manifest themselves in
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treaty terms which reflect impaired consent, and which proceed to impair
the consent of others.
1. Coercion, Exploitation, and the Terms of Market Access
The terms and timing of market access can speak volumes about a
weaker party’s capacity to protect its markets from external competition
before local industry is ready. Moreover, when we look at which sectors
are excluded by whom and why, we get a more complete picture of the
weaker party’s ability, or lack thereof, to bargain for what it wanted and
needed.
To take the agriculture sector as an example, CAFTA eliminates the
protections in place for regional small-scale farmers and agricultural
workers in several key sectors such as rice and yellow corn,49 exposing
them to immediate competition from highly subsidized U.S. agricultural
products.50 However, the United States assiduously maintained protection
of sugar,51 one of its most sensitive sectors that had been of interest to
Central American exporters.52 Moreover, in many of the sectors where
CAFTA governments announced victories, their exports had either already
enjoyed privileged access under the U.S. trade preference programs, or are
effectively blocked by sanitary or phytosanitary measures.53
Such one-sided bargains offer evidence of the disparity in bargaining
power that plagues the treaty.54 In order to understand the consent by
Central American governments to such one-sided provisions, it may be
helpful to employ the concepts of coercion and exploitation developed here.
That such one-sided market access provisions were agreed to by Central
American governments may suggest a coercive aspect to the negotiation, in
which the United States relied on the Central American inequality in power
to keep certain options (such as liberalization of the sugar market) off the
table while pressing ahead for the concessions it wanted.55 Alternatively, or
in tandem, Central American consent can be evidence of exploitation,
insofar as the United States relied on the absence of other states able to
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offer Central America more attractive terms in the “auction.” In either case,
the one-sided nature of the market access provisions in agriculture suggests
that the treaty may not truly reflect free trade.
Even those terms that may at first appear to be U.S. concessions tend to
prove otherwise upon further inspection.56 Concessions on textiles have
been widely trumpeted as one of the premier benefits conferred on the
Central American nations by CAFTA.57

However, the CAFTA textile

provisions include safeguard provisions allowing the United States to
unilaterally impose tariffs if there is a surge of textile imports that have the
potential to hurt domestic manufacturing.58 Such safeguard provisions are
standard in trade agreements and, by themselves, do not suggest an absence
of consent. However, the United States has already used the threat of
invoking this safeguard in an attempt to renegotiate a term of CAFTA.59 At
the behest of the textile lobby, the United States is currently demanding
either the delay of duty-free importation of socks or, alternatively, the
modification of their rule of origin requirements in order to protect the U.S.
sock manufacturing industry.60 Given that the CAFTA nations have not
been receptive to this demand, it appears likely the United States will
invoke this safeguard as retaliation.61
The manner in which the safeguard provisions have been invoked in this
renegotiation illustrates the aspects of U.S. trade negotiations that
jeopardize consent. In this case, under special-interest-based Congressional
pressure, the Bush administration has invoked a lawful provision in an
unlawful manner, as a threat in order to attempt to force a change in the
terms of a previously negotiated trade agreement.

Such an attempt to

change a previously negotiated agreement is coercive. If this were a case in
private law, such modifications would most likely be held invalid under
traditional contracts doctrine.62
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2. Coercion and Law Reform
If we are investigating consent, we should also take a close look at those
aspects of trade agreements that mandate law reform in order to determine
who benefits from these reforms.

For example, the CAFTA services

chapter requires Costa Rica to undertake significant substantive revisions of
its agency and distribution law.63 These revisions can be seen as an end-run
around the protections that such laws typically include for agents and
distributors in the event of termination, to the benefit of foreign—in this
case United States—principals.
The treaty requires Costa Rica to enact new laws which will not presume
that such commercial relationships are exclusive,64 and which mandate that
termination with notice—but absent any breach of obligation—is
nevertheless to be considered termination for just cause, thus waiving all
rights of the agent or distributor to indemnification.65 Finally, all such
contracts will now be deemed subject to private arbitration unless expressly
subject to litigation.66
Although Costa Rican law may have been in some respects more
protective than other developing-country agency laws,67 these changes go
beyond simply conforming Costa Rican law to modern standards. These
changes soften provisions found particularly onerous by U.S. firms, such as
restrictions on their freedom to terminate agreements without cost, and they
limit important rights previously enjoyed by Costa Rican citizens, such as
access to the courts.

This imposition of arbitration is particularly

noteworthy for two reasons: first, because it appears quite self-serving,
given that the United States already influenced Costa Rica towards adopting
U.S.-style arbitration through its influential role in the 1997 overhaul of
Costa Rica’s arbitration system;68 and second, because it seems
opportunistic, given that under U.S. domestic law, the imposition of
arbitration through contracts of adhesion is one ground for their
unenforceability.69 In other words, one of the places where private firms
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exercise their unequal bargaining power over consumers is by imposing
arbitration instead of litigation.
When viewed in this light, the fact that the Costa Rican government
would agree to strip protections from agents and distributors, and to impose
U.S.-style arbitration on a class of private parties through treaty law, may be
evidence of coercion at the state level, which also creates a coercive effect
on private parties. In this sense, CAFTA might be considered an adhesion
treaty.70 Here, CAFTA fails both aspects of free trade: it does not preserve
the bargained-for exchanges among private parties, and in this instance, it is
not itself a voluntarily bargained-for exchange among states.
3. Coercion and Dispute Resolution
Another revealing aspect of trade agreements is the manner in which their
dispute resolution provisions are structured.

Informal nonbinding

consultations, while apparently neutral, favor the more powerful party
because the outcome is not determined by law but by power. Thus, while
the WTO’s binding dispute settlement process has been key to several
victories by developing countries, in NAFTA and CAFTA the dispute
resolution provisions allow disparities in economic power to influence
outcomes.
CAFTA disputes involving the United States are subject to the wishes of
the most powerful party: the United States. When the dispute resolution
implementation provisions are examined closely, it is clear the provisions
echo the NAFTA-style preference on the part of the United States for
nonbinding dispute resolution.71 In other words, the arbitral panel’s final
report is not implemented as a legal decision; rather, it is the basis for a
settlement by the parties, which need not track or implement the panel
report at all.72

Moreover, should the losing party fail to honor its

commitments, or the prevailing party refuse to accept a settlement short of
full implementation, the prevailing party’s only recourse would then be
suspension of equivalent benefits.73 However, it is well-documented that
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such suspensions are particularly inadequate in agreements between states
with great economic disparities, because the markets of small economies are
simply too small for such measures to create any real economic incentive on
the part of a country like the United States to change its policies.74

III. IMPLICATIONS AND APPLICATIONS
A. The Role of Trade Law and Institutions in Safeguarding Consent
If trade agreements do not facilitate consensual economic exchanges, and
are not themselves the result of consensual negotiations, they become
oppressive. One way to envision the role of trade institutions is that of a
playground monitor charged with maintaining a beneficial process of
interaction, but allowing a great deal of latitude to the participants in
establishing their own relationships and conducting their own transactions.
As with playground games, there will be transitory winners and losers, but
the monitor’s role is to watch out for bullying. In CAFTA, there is no
playground monitor—the agreement principally reflects the interests of the
more powerful party, the United States, and leaves it relatively free to
achieve its goals once the agreement itself is implemented.75 In this way,
CAFTA represents a failure on the part of trade law to perform one of its
key social functions.
We should also be concerned when trade relations take on the properties
of a monopoly, because of its stifling and possibly oppressive nature.
Returning to the playground metaphor, one expects to see some turnover as
to who plays which role, who is winning and losing—it is rare for the same
child to always win, and if this happens, the rules or the teams are usually
changed to return the game to the realm of healthy competition, or else the
other children lose interest and the game stops.
The CAFTA treaty sets up a system that resembles the sort of playground
in which the same child wins most of the time, and is perceived as
continuously trying to formulate self-serving rules, with little effective
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restraint and, importantly, with the leverage to force everyone else to play
along—the other children cannot afford to stop playing. At the public level,
such oppressive systems are usually maintained at significant cost to private
citizens through bureaucracies and enforcement mechanisms; the result is a
higher cost than if the system could count on willing participants. From a
trade perspective, this does not necessarily allow for the emergence of the
best products and services.76
B. Liberalism and Trade Agreements
States that seek legitimacy must take care that their foreign policy does
not violate their own founding principles.77

Liberal states risk

compromising their basic commitment to freedom when they fashion or
accept trade agreements that vitiate the consent of the states or peoples they
involve.
Simone Weil writes that the objective of justice is the exercise of consent
in human relations.78 If trade agreements do not establish a framework for
consensual transactions, and are not themselves the fruit of fully consensual
negotiations, they are no longer just—not in the way that liberal states
understand the concept of justice.79 Instead, when concluding such trade
agreements, liberal states risk gratifying what Weil terms that “shameful,
unacknowledged taste for conquests which enslave under the pretense of
liberating.”80 When trade agreements are not made freely, they lose their
moral justification for liberal states.
C. Trade and Security
Finally, trade agreements that are not consensual create conditions for
“blowback,” or unintended adverse policy consequences.81 Perceptions of
injustice are strong motivators and can lead to civil conflict, instability, and
violent counter-reaction.82 One current manifestation of blowback for the
United States is the resurgence of leftist authoritarian populism in Latin
America.83 To many in the region, the unequal terms and social unrest
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caused by agreements such as CAFTA represent failures of democracy.84
Hence, for example, the rhetoric and appeal of Venezuelan President Hugo
Chavez, his Bolivarian Revolution and his increasing influence in the
region, which taps into a long history of resentment at foreign intervention
and at governance by local elites indebted to or enamored of foreign
interests.85
The United States may find it is undermining its goal of spreading
democracy and enhancing security for the country through its current
hemispheric trade policies that infringe on consent and perpetuate inherent
injustices.86

Eschewing opportunities for coercive or exploitative trade

agreements might allow the region’s people to finally enjoy the gains of
trade while simultaneously weakening the attractiveness of leftist
authoritarianism.

Thus, for the people of the United States, there is a

mutually reinforcing relationship between consensual economic relations
and our own security.

IV. CONCLUSION
In order for trade to be truly free and to be “trade” in the fullest sense, it
must be mutual, consensual, bargained-for, and it must involve the
exchange of equivalent value. Free trade must be consensual, in the sense
that all parties are free to enter into the transactions, and perhaps even more
importantly, that all parties have had a meaningful role in formulating the
rules of play. If economic exchange is not consensual in both senses, it is
not trade, but instead some form of extraction. If it is not fully consensual,
then it involves some form of oppression, such as coercion or exploitation.
An examination of CAFTA suggests that the pattern of trade in this
hemisphere is not truly free trade.

Even a preliminary examination of

CAFTA’s substantive provisions and negotiation history reveals elements
of coercion, exploitation, and predation. Should this pattern continue for
U.S.-driven hemispheric integration, it does not bode well for regional
development, or for U.S. political ideals and domestic security.
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